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COMMENTS
EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL IN THE
UNIONIZED SETTING
The American employment at-will doctrine holds that either the employer
or the employee may terminate an employment relationship upon giving no-
tice to the other.1 Unless there is an employment contract expressly specify-
1. The employment at-will doctrine was first enunciated as a rule of evidence in Horace
Grey Wood's treatise, MASTER AND SERVANT (1877).
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring
at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him
to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time
being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a
day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877).
Wood's Rule was pronounced without analysis and was purportedly supported by four
American cases: Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 254 (1872); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871); Tatterson v. Suf-
folk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); and De Briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851). None of
these cases directly supports Wood's Rule.
De Briar concerned the ejectment of a discharged bartender from his tavern lodgings after
notification by his landlord, who was incidentally his former employer. The narrow holding of
the case dealt with the tavernkeeper's rights, not the employer's. Tatterson supports Wood's
Rule only by proving the exception. The Massachusetts court found that the jury did not err
in implying from the parties' oral and written communications, practices of the trade, and
other surrounding circumstances, that a contract for a definite term existed. Franklin Mining
likewise proves the exception. The court found that employment of indefinite duration did not
necessarily give the employer complete discretion to discharge. The employee, who had been
promised stable employment, was discharged after eight months. The jury found that employ-
ment for a one-year term should be inferred from the facts and awarded the employee four
additional months' pay. The inference of a one-year term is noteworthy in light of the English
rule, which provided such a term for most workers. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying
text. Finally, Wilder had nothing to do with hiring or discharge; rather, it concerned a trans-
portation contract. A group of entrepreneurs attempted to use an outdated contract and the
exigencies of the situation to force the U.S. Army quartermaster to renegotiate for transporta-
tion of goods across Minnesota. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Claims' decision
that the entrepreneurs had a right to collect the additional fees because the statute of limita-
tions on the claim had run.
Wood's Rule was accepted quickly by a majority of American jurisdictions. Approximately
30 years after its introduction, one American court, in adopting Wood's Rule, noted that it
was supported by overwhelming authority, such that "the cases [were] too numerous to justify
citation." Harrod v. Wineman, 146 Iowa 718, 720, 125 N.W. 812, 813 (1910). Commentators
also noted the acceptance of Wood's Rule throughout the United States. 1 G. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 39 (1920); 1 C. LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT § 159 (1913). The Supreme
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ing a term of employment or otherwise governing conditions for dismissal or
leaving employment, the employment can be said to be "at-will." 2 Collec-
tive bargaining agreements, however, generally provide unionized workers
protection against dismissal except "for cause.",3 Determination of whether
a dismissal is "for cause" is left to the grievance procedures provided for in
the collective bargaining agreement.4 Relief may also be sought for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement through suit under section 301(a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act.5 The Taft-Hartley Act, however, declared bargained-for
Court elevated the right of an employer to discharge to a constitutional right in Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173-76 (1908) (statute prohibiting discharge of railroad employee
for union membership unconstitutional). Accord Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1915)
(statute prohibiting employers from requiring employees to agree not to join unions unconsti-
tutional). Although Wood's Rule was promulgated as a rule of evidence, courts in the late
19th and early 20th centuries apparently treated it as black letter law on the employment
relationship itself. See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335,
342 & nn.56-57 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Contract Rights] and cases cited
therein.
Following the courts' interpretation of Wood's Rule as a rule of employment, student com-
mentators have derided Wood's Rule as lacking authority or as the result of faulty analysis.
See, e.g., Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra, at 342; Note, Job Security for the At Will
Employee: Contractual Right of Discharge for Cause, 57 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 697, 699-700
(1981); Note, Judicial Limitation of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
552, 555 & n.24 (1980). It is indeed difficult to see how the ejectment of an out-of-work
bartender in DeBriar and the attempt to bilk the United States Army in Wilder gave rise to an
almost absolute right of discharge. Tatterson and Franklin Mining, however, by proving the
exception, show that Wood's Rule works admirably as a rule of evidence, its intended purpose.
2. See Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 107,
107 (1942).
3. Statements concerning dismissal "for cause" or "for just cause" are found in the vast
majority of collective bargaining agreements. See 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIA-
TIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) § 40:1 (1983); see also INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MA-
CHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, CONSTITUTION, platform, § 2 (1985) (enunciating the
goal of adopting a plan to provide stable and full employment for all members of the union).
"Cause" for dismissal may be included in the language of the collective bargaining agreement
and will usually include unauthorized striking, violation of company or safety rules, failure to
meet work standards, intoxication, dishonesty, excessive absenteeism, and insubordination. 2
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra, at § 40:1-3.
4. Grievance procedures were found in all of the collective bargaining agreements sur-
veyed in one major study. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 3, at § 51:1. Of these,
97% called for binding arbitration as the last step of the grievance procedure. Id. § 51:5.
Because of the number of grievance procedures that include binding arbitration as the final
step, "grievance procedure" and "arbitration procedure" may be used interchangeably.
5. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
§ 301(a), 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982 & Supp. 11983)), reads:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id. See also infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
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grievance procedures to be the preferred method of settlement.6 With few
exceptions, 7 an employee must exhaust his grievance remedy before bringing
suit for breach of contract.8 Judicial deference to arbitration decisions is
almost absolute.9 This combination of exhaustion of grievance procedures
as a prerequisite to suit, the number of such grievance procedures ending in
arbitration, and judicial deference to arbitration have one practical result:
the bargained-for grievance procedure is the unionized worker's exclusive
remedy for any grievance, including breach of contract.'° Despite the fed-
6. "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpreta-
tion of an existing collective bargaining agreement." Taft-Hartley Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). See also infra notes 172-202 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364 (1984) (trustees of
multiemployer trust funds not bound to grievance procedures in the absence of intent on the
part of the parties to so bind the trustees); Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969)
(employee excused from exhaustion requirement where pursuit of the grievance would be fu-
tile); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (employee excused from exhaustion of grievance pro-
cedure requirement where employer's aggrieved conduct constituted a repudiation of the
collective bargaining agreement or where a union processes the grievance in an arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or perfunctory manner, or in a manner evincing bad faith towards the grieving
employee); see also Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 752 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1985) (retired
employees not required to exhaust grievance procedures before instituting uit under § 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act for enforcement of pension provisions). See alao infra notes 153-68 and
accompanying text.
8. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965); Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184.
After exhaustion of the grievance procedures, a subsequent breach of contract action brought
under § 301 will be dismissed by the federal district court. The district court will not hear an
employee's § 301 claim because that employee is bound to the contractual grievance proce-
dure. "[Tihat agreement [governs] the manner in which contractual rights may be enforced."
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184.
Maddox and Vaca purport to speak only to those situations where the grievance procedure
is intended to be the exclusive means of dispute resolution. However, judicial deference to
arbitration, enunciated most clearly in the Steelworkers Trilogy, discussed infra at notes 171-
201 and accompanying text, operates in the following manner to imply that the grievance
procedure is meant to be the exclusive means of dispute resolution whether the collective bar-
gaining agreement is explicit or not. First, the courts will decline to review the merits of a
grievance before it is arbitrated. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
567-68 (1960). Second, orders to arbitrate should not be denied "unless ... the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers" the grievance. United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). Finally, once a grievance is
arbitrated, the courts will decline to review the arbitration award insofar as the award is within
the power of the arbitrator as defined by the collective bargaining agreement. United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1960). Thus, nearly every
dispute over the interpretation and administration of a collective bargaining agreement is
within the scope of the grievance procedure. Once a dispute is within the scope of that proce-
dure, the courts will not examine the dispute within the Enterprise Wheel & Car guidelines.
The grievance procedure effectively becomes the exclusive means of dispute resolution. See
infra notes 172-202 and accompanying text.
9. See supra note 8; see also infra notes 172-202 and accompanying text.
10. See supra note 8; see also infra notes 172-202 and accompanying text.
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eral preference for arbitration over litigation in contract disputes, and fed-
eral preemption of most breach of contract suits that may arise,"1 some
courts have recently allowed unionized workers to sue their employers in
state court, asserting claims arising under certain judicially defined excep-
tions to the employment at-will doctrine.' 2
This Comment will examine the conditions under which such suits are
allowed. The Comment will emphasize the development of federal labor law
preemption and how recent cases have cultivated that development. The
employment at-will doctrine will be discussed briefly as well. The Comment
further will examine the impact of allowing state judicial remedies for
wrongful discharge on the federal preference for arbitration. Finally, the
Comment will discuss how this development may adversely affect collective
bargaining as the preferred means of protecting workers against wrongful
discharges as well as the Supreme Court's recent response to this develop-
ment during the 1985 term.1"
I. EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL
A. Common Law Development
The employment at-will doctrine is a peculiar American development of
the late nineteenth century.1 4 Until that time, employment law in the
United States had generally followed English precedent.' 5 English law ad-
dressing the subject of term of employment dates back to 1349, when both
dismissal and quitting before the end of a term were proscribed.16 The gen-
eral rule, noted by Blackstone, was that hiring without a specified term was a
hiring for one year.17 Although Blackstone's one-year rule was applied in
11. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 30-47 and accompanying text.
13. See Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985) (state tort claim preempted where
adjudication of the claim required state court to interpret substantive terms of the collective
bargaining agreement). See also infra notes 266-88 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 1.
15. C. SMITH, MASTER AND SERVANT 40-42 (1852). Smith noted that, after Blackstone,
America still followed the rule that a hiring without a specified term was presumed to be for
one year. See infra note 17. The presumption was rebuttable by custom. The employment
relationship could be terminated by mutual consent or, if customary, upon proper notice. C.
SMITH, supra, at 47.
16. Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. III, ch. 1 (1349); 5 Eliz., ch. 4 (1562) (setting the term
at one year), eased for some classes of workers, Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act
(Imp.) 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86, sched. 17 (1875).
17. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425
If the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it to
be a hiring for a year; upon a principal of natural equity, that the servants shall serve,
and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective sea-
[Vol. 34:979
Employment at- Will
America to agricultural and domestic services,18 day laborers were termina-
ble at will.19 In the mid-nineteenth century, American law began a startling
move away from the English. Although both treatises and case law still
applied Blackstone's rule,2" it had already been noted that Connecticut did
not agree. 2 In 1877, Horace Gray Wood advanced the employment at-will
doctrine as a rule of evidence.22 Although occasionally courts did invoke
Wood's Rule as a rule of evidence,23 it eventually became a black letter rule
of employment relations in most jurisdictions.2" One succinct pronounce-
ment of the doctrine read: "All may dismiss their employes [sic] at will...
for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being
thereby guilty of legal wrong."'25 The authority Wood relied upon for his
novel proposition, however, did not support the doctrine fully. 26 Neverthe-
less, Wood's Rule apparently served important societal interests during the
sons, as well as when there is work to be done, as when there is not: but the contract
may be made for any larger or smaller term.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Blackstone also provided for a three-month notice requirement for any discharge by the
master or quitting by the servant, even when the termination occurs at the end of a term. Id.
The notice requirement was dispensed with in all cases, though, "upon reasonable cause, to be
allowed by a justice of the peace: but they may part by consent, or make a special bargain."
Id. at *425-26. Thus, the rule of hiring for one year was not unduly burdensome on all parties.
18. R. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 219 (1965).
19. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258-59 (2d ed. 1832). The split
between domestic servants and other kinds of laborers is also acknowledged in Blackstone.
Apprentices, for example, though bound for a term of years, could be released upon reasonable
cause at quarter sessions. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *426. Day laborers were an
entirely different class, hired by the day or week, and terminable at those intervals. Id. at
*426-27.
20. C. SMITH, MASTER AND SERVANT (1852); see, e.g., Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255
(1857). Davis specifically relied on Blackstone's "seasonal" rationale to support the yearly
hiring rule. Id. at 257.
21. T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN
AND WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
347 (1846).
22. H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). As written, the doctrine is a rule of
evidence, placing the burden of proof on the employee to show that the hiring was not at will,
but for a specified term. See supra note 1.
23. See generally Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 1, at 342 & nn.56-57.
24. C. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 159 (2d ed.
1913).
25. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). Despite its overruling, Ten-
nessee courts still use Payne as authority for the employment at-will doctrine to this day. See
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tenn. 1984) (exception to the general em-
ployment at-will doctrine created to give at-will workers cause of action for retaliatory dis-
charge for filing workmen's compensation claim); see also Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621
S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tenn. 1981).
26. See supra note 1.
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Industrial Revolution" and became the majority rule in this country by the
turn of the century.2 8
27. The determination of those societal interests and how those interests were served is, of
course, a political exercise. Most commentators agree that dominant laissez-faire economic
doctrine is an understandable analysis for the functioning of the employment at-will rule. See,
e.g., Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissalk Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481 (1976); Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abu-
sive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967). Laissez-faire economics
was played out in the employment at-will rule in the following manner: under the guise of
freedom of contract, employer and employee were supposed to be able to strike the most equi-
table bargain possible for labor. The Supreme Court fully accepted the premise that bargain-
ing power was equal between employer and employee in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908). "It was the right of the defendant to prescribe the terms upon which the services of
Coppage would be accepted, and it was the right of Coppage to become or not, as he chose, an
employe (sic] of the railroad company upon the terms offered to him." Id. at 172-73.
At the same time, nonlegal minds realized that other forces operated in individual bargain-
ing between employer and employee. Woodrow Wilson commented: "Men are cheap and
machinery is dear. . . . You can discard your man and replace him; there are others ready to
come into his place; but you can't without great cost, discard your machine and put a new one
in its place." H. WASSERMAN, HARVEY WASSERMAN'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 34
(1972). This analysis by the 28th President of the United States runs parallel to that of Karl
Marx, who wrote:
Further, as the division of labour increases, labour is simplified. The special skill of
the worker becomes worthless. He becomes transformed into a simple, monotonous
productive force that does not have to use intense bodily or intellectual faculties. His
labour becomes a labour that anyone can perform. Hence, competitors crowd upon
him on all sides, and besides we remind the reader that the more simple and easily
learned the labour is, the lower the cost of production needed to master it, the lower
do wages sink, for, like the price of every other commodity, they are determined by
the cost of production.
K. MARX, DAS CAPITAL, ch. V., reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 214 (R. Tucker 2d
ed. 1978) (emphasis in original). The obvious conclusion to this analysis is that, due to market
forces, workers individually have no bargaining power. Arguably, without bargaining power,
the freedom to contract is worthless. The employment at-will rule, therefore, can be viewed as
a rule dealing with the employment relationship when the bargaining relationship has made an
individual contract of employment for term superfluous. However, Payne v. Western & Atl.
R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179
S.W. 134 (1915), a case noted for its succinct pronouncement of the employment at-will doc-
trine, see supra note 25, treated the absence of contracts as controlling:
The sufficient and conclusive answer to the many plausible arguments to the con-
trary, portraying the evil to workmen and to others from the exercise of such author-
ity by the great and strong, is: They have the right to discharge their employes [sic]
... . If they break contracts with workmen they are answerable only to them; if in
the act of discharging them, they break no contract, then no one can sue for loss
suffered thereby. Trade is free; so is employment.
Payne, 81 Tenn. at 520. See generally Blades, supra note 27. Blades called the absolute right
of discharge "the prime source of the employer's power over his employee." Id. at 1405. See
also Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at
Will, 17 AMER. Bus. L.J. 467, 467-68 & n. 1 (1980); see generally Note, The Employment at
Will Rule, 31 ALA. L. REV. 421 (1980).
28. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34:979
Employment at- Will
As societal attitudes toward policy restraints on employment relations and
freedom of contract have changed,2 9 exceptions to the at-will doctrine have
emerged.
B. Emergence of Exceptions
Exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine have surfaced in three dif-
ferent areas: antidiscrimination legislation,3 ° collective bargaining, 31 and ju-
dicial decisions.32 Collective bargaining has, as one of its aims, the goal of
providing a specific term of employment. 33 In this respect, collective bar-
gaining agreements that contain express contract provisions for a term of
employment should be outside the scope of this discussion. This Comment
hopes to demonstrate, however, a particular application of certain at-will
concepts to the unionized setting. 34 Judicial decisions since Wood's treatise
have established the doctrine of employment at-will as much more than
Wood's Rule; it is the entire body of case law allowing the employer absolute
discretion to discharge, and those judicially defined instances where the em-
ployer may not exercise that discretion with impunity.3 5
29. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 27. This seminal article christened the tort -' "abusive
discharge." See id. at 1413. For the purposes of this Comment, "abusive discharge" may be
and is used interchangeably with "wrongful discharge."
30. See, e.g., title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982 & Supp. I
1983); ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1981); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 1985); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1985). These statutes all deal with discrimination
based on race, color, religion, natural origin, or sex. In the same manner, the elderly are
protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982); veterans by the Veterans Preference Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1982); debtors by the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1674(a) (1982); and jurors by the Jury System Im-
provement Act of 1978, § 6, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
31. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(as amended by Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat.
136 (1947), and Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982 & Supp. I
1983)) (securing employees' rights to band together for mutual aid and protection and making
it an unfair labor practice to discharge employees for exercise of those rights); see also supra
note 3 (concerning "just cause" dismissal standards found in collective bargaining
agreements).
32. See infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text; see also Note, A Common Law Action
for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975); Note, Implied Contract
Rights, supra note 21; Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows
the Whistle" A Cause of Action Based on Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REv.
777.
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 203-88 and accompanying text.
35. See generally Note, Judicial Limitation of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 54 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 552 (1980) (overview to 1980 of development of exceptions to the employment
at-will doctrine).
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Historically, courts have been able to circumvent the harsh operation of
the at-will doctrine, either by finding a contract for a definite period of time
or by enforcing a contract purporting to make the employee permanent.3 6
The leading state court case breaking from this circuitous method was
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396.37
Petermann, an at-will business agent of the Teamsters, alleged that he was
discharged for refusing to commit perjury at his employer's behest. Brought
as a breach of contract action, the case was adjudged on the pleadings in
favor of the defendant.3 ' The California District Court of Appeal reversed,
relying on authority holding that the right to discharge an employee at-will
may be limited by statute.3 9 The court went further, however, and an-
nounced the proposition that the right to discharge may be limited "by con-
siderations of public policy."'
36. See id. at 560 n.57.
37. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
38. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
39. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (citing Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App.
2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949)) (under California election code, at-will employee may not be
discharged for absence from work due to position as election officer).
40. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. The court reiterated a definition of "public policy" used by
the California courts: "By 'public policy' is intended that principle of law which holds that no
citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the
public good .... ." Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (quoting Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953) (emphasis added by Petermann court)).
The court was offended by the notion that an employer could hold such coercive power over its
employees at the expense of the administration of justice. "It would be obnoxious to the inter-
ests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to
discharge any employee, whether the employment be for a designated or unspecified duration,
on the ground that the employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by
statute." Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27. The court also considered whether the union had acted
in good faith in discharging Petermann, noting that a good faith requirement is imposed upon
employers. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 28.
In Petermann, the public policy considerations invoked by the court to restrain the em-
ployer's right of discharge were based on statutory provisions dealing with the felony of per-
jury. A statute need not specifically prohibit discharge in order to serve as a sufficient public
policy bar to discharge. See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984)
(California health laws provide a sufficient statutory basis to award damages for employee's
dismissal for refusal to break those laws), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985); Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (federal
antitrust laws provide sufficient statutory basis to restrain employee's discharge for refusal to
join in price-fixing scheme). Workmen's compensation statutes have been found to be a suffi-
cient statutory basis of public policy in some states to preclude discharge that is implicitly in
retaliation for the filing of a claim. See, e.g., Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional
Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983) (cause of action implied from the comprehensive statutory
scheme of workmen's compensation); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425
(Ind. 1973) (same); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (same);
Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1984) (same); Sventko v. Kroger
Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) (same); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677
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While dictum in Petermann suggested that California might grant a broad
public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine, subsequent cases
in California have sharply limited such exceptions.41 The California Labor
Code currently contains a formal pronouncement of the employment at-will
doctrine.
4 2
Similarly, courts in other jurisdictions have adopted the "public policy
tort"43 exception to the employment at-will doctrine. In those states, a
cause of action will lie for employees who can show that their discharge
violates public policy." Compensatory and punitive damages may be made
S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984) (same). Many more states expressly provide a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge for filing a workmen's compensation claim. See generally, Annot., 32
A.L.R.4th 1221 (1984).
Petermann's second cause of action, although not relevant to this discussion of the employ-
ment at-will doctrine, was that he was arbitrarily issued a withdrawal card from the union and
that the issuance of the card was done with the intent to harm him. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 26.
The dismissal of the second cause of action was upheld because of Petermann's failure to
exhaust the union's internal remedies before coming before the courts. Failure to exhaust
internal union remedies figures prominently in this Comment's discussion of federal preemp-
tion of state tort claims for retaliatory discharge.
41. See, e.g., Becket v. Welton Becket & Assocs., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531
(1974) (no cause of action arises for employee discharged for suing employer while employee
was serving in his capacity of executor of an estate); Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390,
6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960) (no cause of action arises for employee discharged for making herself
available for jury duty). The Becket court's reasoning was that no cause of action arose be-
cause the duty that the employee owed to the estate was private in nature and was not a duty
owed to the state. The state declined to extend its protection for employees who act out of
duty to the state to those who act out of duty to others. Accord Campbell v. Ford Indus., 274
Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976). A Ford employee who also owned common stock in Ford
alleged that he was discharged for attempting to exercise his statutory right to inspect Ford's
business records. The Oregon Supreme Court held that Campbell's interest was "private and
proprietary" rather than based on a compelling state interest. Hence, Campbell could not
claim that his discharge contravened public policy, even though it may have been in retaliation
for his exercise of his statutory rights. 274 Or. 250, 546 P.2d at 145. But cf Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980) ("[U]nless an employee at
will identifies a specific expression of public policy, he may be discharged with or without
cause.").
42. "An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either
party on notice to the other." Employment for a specific term means employment for a period
greater than one month. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1985).
43. See Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At- Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153
(1981).
44. In West Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that "where the employer's
motivation for the discharge contravenes some substantial public policy principle, then the
employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by the discharge." Harless v.
First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978). Harless' wrongful discharge claim was
that he was terminated for reporting to the bank's own board of directors that the bank rou-
tinely violated the state's consumer protection laws. Harless sought compensatory and puni-
tive damages.
In Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), the Oregon Supreme Court "created a
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available whether or not there is a specific statutory codification of that pol-
icy. 45 Where there is no public policy designated by statute, courts have
focused on the public nature of the defendant's conduct and the desirability
of the effects of that conduct.46 Unless the interests of the public are sub-
stantially implicated, courts are reluctant to intervene in the employment
relationship.47
II. LABOR LAW PREEMPTION
The employment at-will doctrine and exceptions to the doctrine are devel-
oped wholly within the states. To understand the peculiar application of the
employment at-will doctrine in the unionized setting, we must first examine
the manner in which federal law normally preempts state law in the collec-
tive bargaining process.
The doctrine of federal preemption of state law is enshrined in the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.48 Where Congress
right in plaintiff" to recover damages where "substantial 'societal interests'" are violated by an
employee's discharge. Id. at 220, 536 P.2d at 516. Nees was able to recover compensatory but
not punitive damages when she was discharged after serving jury duty. Contra Mallard v.
Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960); see supra note 41.
45. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980). Tameny alleged he was discharged for refusing to participate in a gasoline price-
fixing scheme. While the price-fixing scheme would violate the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982 & Supp. 1 1983), the Cartwright Act, 1941 Cal. Stat. ch. 526, § 1 (codified at CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 16,720 (West 1964)), and the consent decree entered in an antitrust prosecu-
tion against Atlantic Richfield, the California Supreme Court's analysis did not depend on
specific statutory limitations on the employment relationship. Rather, the court noted that an
employer's duty to refrain from firing an employee for refusing to commit a crime is a funda-
mental public policy. 27 Cal. 3d at 176-77, 610 P.2d at 1335-36, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844-45. See
also Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 244 P.2d 25 (1959), discussed supra at notes 37-41 and
accompanying text. But cf Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468
(9th Cir. 1984), discussed infra at notes 238-60 and accompanying text (federal labor law and
§ 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act preempted state wrongful discharge action, in part, because
only federal statutes were cited in the complaint as a public policy basis and the state had little
interest in enforcing federal mine safety statutes).
46. See supra note 41.
47. See, e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974) (cause of action
not permitted without substantial public interest evidenced by statute); Note, The Employ-
ment-At-Will Rule: The Development of Exceptions and Pennsylvania's Response, 21 DuQ. L.
REV. 477 (1983).
48. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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properly exercises its constitutional power,49 contrary state law must yield; it
is preempted.5" Congress has exercised its authority to regulate private sec-
tor labor-management relations in several major statutes: the National La-
bor Relations (Wagner) Act (NLRA);5" the Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA), which incorporated and amended the Wagner
Act;52 Title VII of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Lan-
drum-Griffin) Act (LMRDA);53 and the Railway Labor Act.
54
* The functioning of this comprehensive statutory scheme governing private
sector labor relations gives rise to two closely allied branches of preemption
analysis. The branch first articulated is based upon the primary jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).-- The second, clarified rel-
atively recently, is based upon the supremacy clause. 56 The Taft-Hartley
Act also provides the federal courts with jurisdiction in suits arising from
breaches of collective bargaining agreements. 7 The preemptive operation of
49. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I. Article I enumerates the powers of Congress. Article I,
section 8 grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Section 1 of the Taft-Hartley Act reads, in part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
50. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (New York state law awarding exclu-
sive franchise for ferry trafic between New York City and Elizabethtown, New Jersey, pre-
empted by congressional power to regulate interstate commerce). The term "preemption" was
not used by the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden.
51. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69
(1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
52. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.).
53. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.). The first three statutes cited herein, the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act
(NLRA), the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA), and some sections of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act (LMRDA), com-
monly known collectively as the Taft-Hartley Act, are codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983) and generally govern private-sector labor relations. When
considering the NLRA, the LMRA, and revelant sections of the LMRDA, this Comment shall
refer to pertinent sections of the U.S. Code under their Taft-Hartley Act rubrics.
54. Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
55. See infra notes 58-93, 115-29, and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 94-114, 115-29, and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
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these provisions is discussed below in seriatim.
A. Preemption by the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB:
Garner-Garmon-Sears
In 1953, the Supreme Court issued its first major decision concerning con-
duct prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act in Garner v. Teamsters, Local 776. 58
In Garner, the Teamsters picketed a nonunion trucking operation in Penn-
sylvania, demanding recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent for the
firm's employees. 9 The picketing was allegedly unlawful under Penn-
sylvania law 6 and it also arguably constituted an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b)(2) of the Taft-Hartley Act.61  The Supreme Court held that
Congress had preempted the field through enactment of a comprehensive
statutory scheme in the Taft-Hartley Act and that the Pennsylvania courts
therefore lacked the power to enjoin the picketing. 62 The Court maintained
that the NLRB, not the courts, had the "duty of primary decision" in cases
falling under the Taft-Hartley Act.63 It emphasized that a single tribunal,
the NLRB, with a single procedure and set of substantive rules governing
labor relations within the Taft-Hartley Act, was the best guarantor of uni-
formity in the administration of the Act." The Garner Court thus first ar-
ticulated the rule that a state may neither invoke its own laws that duplicate
the prohibitive provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act nor provide a remedy
under either state law or the Taft-Hartley Act for conduct prohibited by the
Act.
65
This primary jurisdiction branch of the preemption doctrine was rein-
58. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
59. Id. at 487.
60. Id. at 487 n.3. The language of the Pennsylvania labor statute is similar to that of the
NLRA. See infra note 60.
61. By picketing the Garner docks, the Teamsters induced other unions to curtail business
with Garner. This, in turn, coerced Garner into encouraging the nonunion employees to join
the Teamsters. 346 U.S. at 487. The Teamsters arguably were attempting to cause the em-
ployer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment on the basis of the employee's
lack of union membership.
Section 8(b)(2) of the Taft-Hartley Act reads, in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents. . . to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discrimi-
nate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) . 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982
& Supp. 1 1983).
Section 8(a)(3) reads, in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
62. 346 U.S. at 490-91.
63. Id. at 489.
64. Id. at 490-91.
65. Id. at 489-91.
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forced in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.66 The California
Supreme Court had affirmed the issuance of an injunction against picketing
by the Teamsters and upheld a damage award to the employer for business
lost during the picketing.67 The United States Supreme Court remanded for
reconsideration because of certain recent decisions concerning the NLRB's
jurisdiction.68 On remand, the California high court dissolved the injunction
but sustained the award of damages.69 The Supreme Court again granted
certiorari.7 ° Expanding the Garner preemption analysis, the Court held that
both the states and the federal judiciary must defer to the expertise of the
NLRB in the regulation of conduct arguably protected or prohibited by sec-
tion 771 or by section 872 of the Taft-Hartley Act.73 The Court reasoned that
centralized administration of the Act by the NLRB alone would avoid con-
flict-especially state conflict-with national labor policy.74 Thus, Califor-
nia courts were not permitted to pass judgment on whether the picketing
was in fact an unfair labor practice prohibited by section 8(b)(2) of the Taft-
Hartley Act.75
The Garmon preemption analysis was refined nineteen years later in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters.7 6 Like
Garmon and Garner before it, the case involved the peaceful picketing of a
business. The employer filed suit to enjoin picketing that was taking place
on its property.7 7 In reviewing the state supreme court's decision that the
suit was preempted,78 the Supreme Court expressed concern that the Gar-
mon preemption analysis, on its face, may overly impinge on state jurisdic-
66. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
67. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955).
68. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957).
69. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 615, 320 P.2d 473, 485
(1957).
70. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 357 U.S. 925 (1958).
71. 359 U.S. at 245. Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act protects employees' rights to or-
ganize and bargain collectively with employers, to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid
and protection, or to refrain from organization, collective bargaining, and concerted activity
for mutual aid and protection. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
72. 359 U.S. at 245. Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act delineates prohibited unfair labor
practices. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
73. 359 U.S. at 245.
74. "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the
federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if
the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." Id.
75. Id. at 243.
76. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
77. Id. at 182-83.
78. Id. at 184. The California Supreme Court held that the conduct was both arguably
protected and arguably prohibited. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Coun-
cil of Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d 893, 906, 553 P.2d 603, 613, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443, 453 (1976).
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tion over conduct traditionally subject to state regulation, such as the
property interests here. 79 The Court responded by developing a more com-
plex preemption analysis. First examining whether the union's conduct was
arguably prohibited by section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act,8 ° the Court in-
quired whether the focus of the state court would be the same as the focus of
the NLRB if both were presented with the union's conduct. Here, Sears,
Roebuck had challenged only the location of the picketing, claiming it was a
trespass.81 Sears, Roebuck had not claimed that the picketing was an unfair
labor practice. The state court, therefore, would not have to examine
whether the picketing was protected or prohibited activity under the Taft-
Hartley Act to determine whether a trespass had occurred. 2 Conversely,
had Sears, Roebuck filed unfair labor practice charges against the union, the
NLRB would not have to examine whether a trespass had occurred under
California law.8 3 In short, there was no potential for conflict between the
primary jurisdiction of the NLRB and the state-protected property interest
before the California courts. On this "arguably prohibited" wing of the
Sears analysis, the state claim was not preempted.
4
The Sears Court then examined the "arguably protected" aspect of the
union's conduct85 and found two distinct preemption concerns: (1) the pri-
mary jurisdiction of the NLRB, and (2) the possibility of state interference
with federally protected rights under section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act.86 On
the peculiar facts of Sears, the union involved could have invoked the juris-
diction of the NLRB to litigate whether its trespass was federally pro-
79. Sears, 436 U.S. at 190.
80. The California courts had considered that the union's conduct arguably was unlawful
recognitional picketing in violation of § 8(b)(7)(C) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(7)(C) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). That section prohibits picketing by a union for more
than thirty days where the object of the picketing is to force the employer to recognize the
union as the exclusive bargaining agent for its employees, if the union has not filed a petition
with the NLRB requesting a representation election. Id.
The United States Supreme Court also indicated that the union's conduct might have been
violative of § 8(b)(4)(D). If the union's object was to force the employer to shift work assign-
ments from nonunion employees to union employees on the basis of union membership, the
picketing would violate § 8(b)(4)(D). See Sears, 436 U.S. at 186 & n.9.
81. Sears, 436 U.S. at 185 & n.8.
82. Id. at 185, 198.
83. Id. at 185-87, 198.
84. Id. at 198.
85. Id. at 200-01. Arguably, the union's conduct was protected if its purpose was to pub-
licize Sears, Roebuck's undercutting of prevailing area wages. This conduct would be con-
certed activity for mutual aid and protection within the meaning of § 7 of the Act. See
generally Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 136 N.L.R.B. 321, 323 (1962) (discussing
area standards picketing).
86. Sears, 436 U.S. at 199-200 & nn.29-30.
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tected.87 The employer, however, could not invoke the Board's jurisdiction
to have the trespass declared unprotected. 8 If the union had invoked
NLRB jurisdiction, the claim would be preempted through the primary ju-
risdiction rationale. Although it did not petition the NLRB, the possibility
still existed that the California courts might prohibit activity that federal
labor law protected. 89 This possibilty of conflict could be sufficient to pre-
empt the state court claim.90 A further interest, however, interposed itself.
If the state were precluded from acting and the union still did not invoke
Board jurisdiction, then neither state nor federal forums would be available
to the plaintiff, Sears, Roebuck.91 In effect, a state court would be required
to weigh the danger of an erroneous ruling that the union's trespass was
federally protected against the "anomalous consequence" of denying the
plaintiff any forum.92
After Sears, the focus of preemption analysis remained on the prohibited
or protected nature of the conduct at issue.9 3 In contrast, the second line of
labor preemption, analytically distinct from the Garner-Garmon-Sears anal-
ysis, is concerned with conduct neither protected nor prohibited by the Taft-
Hartley Act.
B. Unregulated Weapons of Economic Warfare and the Avoidance of
Conflict with Federal Labor Law
The second branch of labor law preemption analysis rests on the premise
87. The union could have invoked the Board's jurisdiction by filing unfair labor practice
charges against Sears, Roebuck. That charge might have been that Sears, Roebuck, in at-
tempting to prevent union solicitation by nonemployees on company property (when there
were no alternative means of communicating the union's message), was interfering with the
Sears, Roebuck employees' free choice in the exercise of their § 7 right to organize. This
restraint would violate § 8(a)(l) of the Act. The trespass, because of its strong nexus with the
exercise of § 7 rights by the picketers, would be federally protected. See generally NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
88. See supra note 79. See also Sears, 436 U.S. at 185-86 & nn.9-10.
89. If the union's activity was area standards picketing, a state court injunction against
the picketing would prohibit federally protected activity. Sears, 436 U.S. at 201 & n.32. See
supra note 85.
90. 436 U.S. at 203.
91. Id. at 202-03.
92. Id. at 206-07. On the face of Sears, the Court saw no significant risk of the California
courts prohibiting federally protected conduct. Id. at 207. Nevertheless, the Court was clear
that this balancing test did not foreclose preemption of any state court action because "it might
be reasonable to infer that Congress preferred the costs inherent in a jurisdictional hiatus to the
frustration of national labor policy which might accompany the exercise of state jurisdiction."
Id. at 203.
93. See generally Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIo
ST. L.J. 277 (1980).
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that in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act,94 Congress sought to strike a balance
of economic power between labor and management." While federal labor
law already eliminates certain tools of economic power, 96 there are certain
activities that are weapons of economic warfare, but that nevertheless are
not within the scope of section 7 or 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act-neither pro-
tected nor prohibited 97-and that, therefore, are not preempted under a Gar-
mon analysis. Under the second branch of preemption analysis, however,
these activities may be immune from state regulation.9" In Local 20, Team-
sters v. Morton, 99 the Supreme Court found that a suit under Ohio's secon-
dary boycott law, " by providing damages for a secondary boycott not
violative of section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act, frustrated congressional in-
tent. 10 Congress, in the Court's view, had expressly authorized the recov-
ery of damages by persons injured by secondary boycotts. 102 Further,
Congress had described "comprehensively and with great particularity"
' 3
the type of conduct prohibited. The Court determined that Congress, by not
proscribing otherwise unprotected conduct, intended to leave that conduct
within the arsenal of available economic weapons." ° In Lodge 76, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis-
sion,' ° 5 the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that this analysis
94. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), incorporating National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), together amended by Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
95. See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1337, 1352 (1972).
96. The conduct proscribed by § 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, unfair labor practices, are all
outlawed tools of economic power. For example, discharging a union sympathizer precisely
for that sympathy, conduct clearly violative of § 8(a)(3), puts economic pressure on the sympa-
thizer's fellow employees to refrain from union support, because of their fear of losing their
jobs.
97. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132 (1976).
98. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245-46.
99. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
100. Simply put, a secondary boycott occurs when a striker appeals to a struck employer's
customers or suppliers to stop doing business with the struck employer. Ohio's rule against
secondary boycotts was a common law rule based on a conspiracy theory. See Perko v. Local
No. 207, 168 Ohio St. 161, 151 N.E.2d 742 (1958) (outlining Ohio rule against secondary
boycotts).
101. Morton, 377 U.S. at 259-60. Section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides for suits
against labor organizations for damages relating to activity that is an unfair labor practice
under § 8(b)(4) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
102. Morton, 377 U.S. at 258.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 259-60.
105. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
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constituted a second rationale for preemption. 106
In Machinists, union members refused to work overtime during a contract
dispute."17 The employer filed unfair labor practice charges with both the
NLRB and the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. The NLRB
regional director declined to issue a complaint because the union members'
conduct was not regulated under the Taft-Hartley Act. 0 8 The Wisconsin
labor commission, however, issued a cease and desist order pursuant to state
law' o9 and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed."' 0
Upon review, the United States Supreme Court held that the Wisconsin
state law was preempted because its enforcement would upset the balance of
economic power between labor and management that Congress had intended
to establish through its comprehensive statutory scheme."1 ' The Court ac-
cepted that Congress, through the Taft-Hartley Act, recognized a system in
which labor and management were permitted self-help" 2 and that such eco-
nomic weapons as the union members' refusal to work overtime were a natu-
ral part of the collective bargaining process. 1 3 Under a Machinists
preemption analysis, the crucial inquiry is whether the state regulation at
issue frustrates the congressional intent to promote collective bargaining
and, in turn, industrial stability.
11 4
C. Exceptions to Garner-Garmon-Sears and Machinists Preemption
The Garner-Garmon-Sears preemption analysis does contain certain ex-
ceptions. States may regulate conduct despite interference with federal labor
policy in three special circumstances. First, Congress, explicitly or implic-
106. Id. at 140.
107. Id. at 133-35.
108. Id. at 135.
109. Id. at 136.
110. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 67 Wis. 2d 13, 226 N.W.2d 203 (1975).
111. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 148-49.
112. Id. at 148-50. The Court expressly overruled UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (Briggs-Stratton). Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141, 151, 154-55.
Briggs-Stratton had stood for the proposition that the state could assert jurisdiction over activi-
ties "neither protected by § 7 nor prohibited by § 8 of the federal [Taft-Hartley] Act." Ma-
chinists, 427 U.S. at 141.
113. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149-50.
114. See id. at 149-51. The inquiry is a difficult one, an "ongoing effort to decipher the
presumed intent of Congress in the face of that body's steadfast silence." Sears, 436 U.S. at
188 n. 12 (per Stevens, J.). Justice Stevens' apparent annoyance with the lack of guidance from
Congress was a factor in his dissent from the majority opinion in Machinists, 427 U.S. at 156
(Stevens, J., dissenting). However, by the time he wrote for the plurality in New York Tele.
Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979), Justice Stevens had acquiesced to
the Court's process of inference.
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itly, has authorized the states to act in some cases.15 Second, there are
certain areas of traditionally local responsibility and concern that cannot be
preempted absent explicit congressional direction." 6 An overriding state in-
terest in regulating otherwise protected or prohibited conduct has been
found sufficient to prevent preemption in cases of violence,117 threats of vio-
lence,' mass picketing," 9 malicious libel,12° and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.121 Finally, states may regulate conduct in instances
where that regulation would be of merely peripheral concern to the effective
administration of federal labor law.
122
These exceptions to the Garner-Garmon-Sears analysis have not been
clearly applied to Machinists preemption. However, in New York Telephone
Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 123 a majority of the Court did
use language indicating that a "local interests" exception could be employed
115. State courts may sit in judgment of claims arising under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). See infra notes 130-36 and
accompanying text. Suit in state court is also permitted under § 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
Implicit authority for state action was found in New York State Tel. Co. v. New York State
Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979). The Court determined that the legislative histories of the
Wagner Act and the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 501-504 (1982 & Supp. I
1983), permitted the states to pay strikers unemployment benefits. New York State TeL, 440
U.S. at 540-44.
116. As the Supreme Court stated in Garmon:
However, due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, in-
cluding the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but
as a promoter of democracy, has required us not to find withdrawal from the States
of power to regulate . . . where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congres-
sional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the
power to act.
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44 (footnote omitted). Accord Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 545
(1983); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 296 (1977); Machinists,
427 U.S. 132, 135 (1976); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees
v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289-90 (1971); Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 257
(1964).
117. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) The Laburnum Court observed: "Congress has neither provided
nor suggested any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting damages
for injuries caused by tortious conduct." 347 U.S. at 663-64.
118. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
119. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
120. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
121. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
122. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44.
123. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
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under a Machinists analysis. 1 24
Suits arising from breaches of collective bargaining agreements provide
another exception to Garner-Garmon-Sears preemption. In Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., ' 25 the Supreme Court noted that because ac-
tions for breach of a collective bargaining agreement have a separate statu-
tory base in section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,1 2 6 the preemption
principles of Garmon 127 are inapposite. 128 Even though the conduct under-
lying a section 301 action may be conduct otherwise preempted under Gar-
mon, the courts are not required to yield to the primary jurisdiction of the
NLRB. 1
29
D. Federal Preemption of State Law in Suits for Breach of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement
Federal jurisdiction in suits for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment is conferred by section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 130 Section 301,
however, is more than a simple jurisdictional statute. It also authorizes the
development of a federal common law concerning enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements.13 1 This is not to say that section 301 jurisdiction is
exclusively federal. State courts may exercise concurrent jurisdiction.1
3 2
However, if a state court does assume jurisdiction, incompatible state law
will be preempted by principles of federal labor law. 133 The Supreme Court
so held in Lucas Flour, 13 determining that application of state laws of con-
tract enforcement inevitably would disrupt the federally structured collective
bargaining process to the detriment of that process.'
35
There are several procedural prerequisites to bringing a section 301
suit.' 36 The most significant is the requirement of exhaustion of contractual
124. See id. at 539-40 (dicta) (quoting the Garmon local interests test); id. at 550 (Black-
mun, J., concurring) (quoting Garmon); id. at 559-60 & n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
There were four opinions in New York Tel; one announcing the decision of the Court (per
Stevens, J.), two concurrences, and one dissent.
125. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
126. Id. at 101 & n.9; see supra note 5.
127. See supra notes 57-93, 115-22, and accompanying text.
128. 369 U.S. at 101 n.9.
129. Id.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982); see supra note 5.
131. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 & n.2 (1957).
132. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
133. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (six-
month statute of limitations between breach of collective bargaining agreement and institution
of § 301 suit).
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remedies.
III. FEDERAL PREFERENCE FOR EXHAUSTION OF ARBITRATION AS AN
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
A. The Exhaustion Prerequisite
The Supreme Court addressed exhaustion of contractual remedies-griev-
ance procedures, in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox."" Charlie Maddox
brought suit in Alabama state court for breach of contract, alleging that he
was owed a certain amount of severance pay under the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement between Republic Steel and his union. 138 That agree-
ment contained a three-step grievance procedure culminating in binding
arbitration. 1
39
Upon eventual appeal, the Supreme Court in Maddox promulgated a gen-
eral rule that employees with grievances must attempt to use the contractual
grievance procedure unless the collective bargaining agreement otherwise
provides.1" Three justifications were given for this rule. First, by requiring
the individual employee to have his claim processed by the union, a court
enhances the union's position as exclusive bargaining agent.14' Second, the
employer reduces the choice of remedies against him in contract disputes. 142
Third, to the extent that the grievance procedure is established as the exclu-
sive remedy, private dispute resolution becomes attractive, and the purpose
of the Taft-Hartley Act, to promote collective bargaining, is carried
forward. 143
The contract between Maddox's union and Republic Steel did not specify
an available remedy other than the grievance procedure for breaches of the
collective bargaining agreement. 1 In addition, the remedy sought by Mad-
dox, severance pay, was within the power of the arbitrator to grant. 14 5 Mad-
dox therefore was required to attempt to use the grievance procedure.
146
Once Maddox received a result from the grievance procedure, whether it be
an arbitration award or a decision by the union not to proceed further with
the grievance, any subsequent section 301 suit would have to be dis-
137. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
138. Id. at 650-51.
139. Id. at 651.
140. Id. at 652-53.
141. Id. at 656.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 653.
144. Id. at 658-59.




missed.147 Maddox, by attempting to use the grievance procedure, had re-
ceived and "exhausted" his bargained-for remedy.
The contours of the Maddox rule, requiring exclusivity of remedy in the
grievance procedures, were drawn more clearly in Vaca v. Sipes. 148 In Vaca,
an employee was discharged for medical reasons. 149 The union processed
the employee's grievance through the fourth step of a five-step process.150 In
the face of a settlement offer by the employer and medical evidence not sup-
portive of the grievance,151 the union's executive board voted to halt the
grievance before the fifth step, arbitration. The employee then demanded
that his union process the grievance through arbitration. When the union
refused, the employee brought suit in Missouri state court against the em-
ployer for breach of contract and against his union for refusing to take the
grievance to arbitration.152
The Supreme Court restated the union's statutory duty of fair representa-
tion 153 and announced two important exceptions to the Maddox exclusivity
principle. First, the Court maintained that an employee should not be lim-
ited to the contractual grievance procedure if the employer's conduct giving
rise to the grievance constituted a repudiation of the contract. 154 A contrary
rule would allow an employer to raise the defense of the exclusivity of con-
tractual procedures that the employer himself had repudiated. 155 Second,
when the union controls processing the grievance and wrongfully refuses to
do so, the employee must be allowed redress.15 6 Whenever a union's con-
duct toward a member is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, or if the
union processes the grievance in a merely perfunctory manner, that conduct
is a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. 157 The employee is
then excused from Maddox exclusivity constraints.158  The question of
whether there was a breach of the union's duty of fair representation is criti-
147. Id. See supra note 8.
148. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
149. Id. at 174-75.
150. Id. at 175. Sipes was the administrator of the estate of the employee, Owens. Owens
suffered from high blood pressure, was discharged for that reason, and sought reinstatement.
Id. at 174-75.
151. Id. at 175. The executive board of the union obtained an independent medical evalua-
tion of Owens' condition and, upon receipt of this report, voted not to proceed with the griev-
ance. Id. The employer had offered to send Owens to a rehabilitation clinic. Id. See infra
notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
152. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 175-76.
153. Id. at 177-78; see Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964).
154. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 185-86.
157. Id. at 190.
158. Id. at 190-91.
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cal to the determination of whether the section 301 action can stand, and the
two alleged breaches must be litigated together.'59 If the union has breached
its duty, suit is allowed because the finality of a grievance decision is de-
stroyed. 6o In that case, an employer is unable to rely on the grievance deci-
sion as a bar to section 301 suits.
16 '
Another exception to Maddox exclusivity, the "futility exception," was
developed under the Railway Labor Act 162 in Glover v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Railway.163 Petitioners brought an action against the railroad and their
union, alleging racial discrimination and praying for legal and equitable re-
lief. " Respondents defended, in part, by asserting that petitioners pos-
sessed remedies under the collective bargaining agreement and were limited
to them, as required under Maddox and Vaca.16' Because of evidence of
collusion between the railroad and the union, the Supreme Court concluded
that use of the bargained-for grievance procedures would be "wholly futile"
and would not be required before suit could be brought by the employee.
166
Another exception has been extended to trustees of multiemployer trust
funds where the collective bargaining agreement evinces no intent by the
parties to bind the trustees to the grievance procedure. 167 Similarly, retirees
have been found not bound to grievance procedures in section 301 actions to
enforce contract provisions concerning pensions.
168
Most important for the purposes of this Comment, however, is the emerg-
ing "public policy exception" to Maddox exclusivity. In certain highly spe-
159. Id. at 183-84; Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 693 n.23, 695 (1981). Problems of proof
are substantial in allegations of breach of the duty of fair representation. Before 1977, for
example, the UAW had admitted breach of its duty only once in 20 years. See Graf v. Elgin, J.
& E. Ry., 697 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1983) (showing of mere negligence insufficient to make out a
cause of action for breach of union's duty of fair representation). In Graf, a union official
placed an employee's grievance in his jacket pocket and forgot about it until after the time for
its filing had lapsed. Id. at 774.
160. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 566 (1976).
161. See id. at 566; see also id. at 569-70.
162. Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
163. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
164. Id. at 325-26.
165. Id. at 329.
166. Id. at 330-31. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also Schultz v. Owens-
Illinois, 696 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (use of grievance procedure excused as futile where union
had already agreed to employer's rejection of a similar grievance with another employee); Cas-
taneda v. Dura-Vent Corp., 648 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1981) (use of grievance procedure excused
where union's lack of support made employees fearful of retaliatory discharge for the filing of a
grievance).
167. Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364 (1984).
168. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 752 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1985).
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cialized circumstances, an arbitration decision16 9 will not be enforced
because that decision is contrary to public policy. 7 ' This Comment con-
tends that these public policy exceptions are developing on a parallel track to
public policy exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine. The Comment
will develop a model applying these employment at-will exceptions to the
unionized context despite the myriad preemption problems presented by the
federal labor law scheme.' 71 In order to appreciate fully the tremendous
difficulties presented to the unionized employee wishing to use employment
at-will doctrine in state court actions, the structure of deferral to the usual
dispute resolution mechanism of collective bargaining must be examined.
B. The Steelworkers Trilogy: Preference and Deference Become Absolute
The preference for contractual grievance-arbitration procedures as a
means of dispute resolution is established by the Taft-Hartley Act.'72 Griev-
ance procedures ending in arbitration are almost invariably found in collec-
tive bargaining agreements. 73  The grievance procedure provides two
essential services to federal labor law. First, as the Supreme Court has
noted, "the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for
169. The "arbitration decision" need not be the decision of an arbitrator at the last step of a
grievance procedure. A good faith decision by a union not to proceed to the last step will
satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 188-95 (discussing whether refusing
to process a grievance to the last step of the procedure constitutes a breach of the union's duty
of fair representation).
170. See, e.g., Local Union 59, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Green Corp., 725 F.2d 264
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 124 (1984) (arbitration decision constituting an unfair labor
practice unenforceable); United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 736
F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984) (court refuses to enforce arbitration award reinstating postal employee
convicted of embezzling postal money orders); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local Union 540
v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983) (court refuses to enforce reinstate-
ment award of discharged truck driver who admittedly drank on duty as contrary to public
policy of preventing drinking and driving); American Postal Workers Union v. United States
Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1982) (arbitration award
reinstating postal worker who had participated in strike vacated because of statute prohibiting
employment of persons who had participated in a strike); Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1982) (vacating arbitration deci-
sion upholding work rule prohibiting direct contact between packing house employees and
federal meat inspectors). The Jones Dairy court specifically noted that "we are aware that
when a court bars enforcement of an arbitration award on the basis of public policy, that
public policy must be clearly defined." 680 F.2d at 1145. Cf Local 45.3, Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963) (arbitra-
tion award ordering reinstatement of employee who gambled on company premises upheld
because public policy against gambling insufficient to overturn award).
171. See infra notes 289-328 and accompanying text.
172. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983); see supra note 6.
173. See supra note 4.
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an agreement not to strike." 174 Second, contractual arbitration provides ef-
fective resolution of disputes over the interpretation and application of a
contract at the level those disputes are understood best-the plant. 175
Judicial sanction of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism was
most clearly enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy.176 The Trilogy involved
suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements under section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act. 177 The first, United Steelworkers v. American Manufac-
turing Co., 178 examined judicial intervention before a dispute was submitted
to arbitration.'79 There, an injured worker who had received compensation
was estopped in the district court from compelling the arbitration called for
in his collective bargaining agreement.'18 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the grievance was
baseless and frivolous. 8' The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the
courts are in no position to adjudge the merits of the alleged contract viola-
tion."' The Court viewed the controversy as a simple breach of contract
question. 83 The union alleged breach of contract for the company's refusal
to arbitrate and the company defended by stating that it was not obligated to
arbitrate meritless grievances. The Court, however, considered this dispute
to be clearly arbitrable.' 84
The determination of whether any contract dispute is arbitrable was ad-
dressed in the second case of the Steelworkers Trilogy, United Steelworkers v.
Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,' in which the Supreme Court pro-
claimed a presumption of arbitrability.' 86 The Court concluded that unless
the arbitration clause was not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the
174. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
175. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 595-96 (1960).
176. United Steelworkers v, Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The decisions were all announced the same day and
have come to be known, then, as the Steelworkers Trilogy. Justice Douglas was the author of
all three majority opinions in the Steelworkers Trilogy.
177. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983); see supra note 5.
178. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
179. Id.
180. 363 U.S. at 566.
181. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959), rev'd,
363 U.S. 564 (1960).
182. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568.
183. Id. at 569.
184. Id.
185. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
186. The majority stated: "An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not suscepti-
ble of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
coverage." Id. at 582-83 (footnote omitted).
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asserted grievance, the courts should determine that the dispute is
arbitrable. 1
87
In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 188 the third case
of the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court declined to review the merits of previ-
ously arbitrated grievances. The majority reasoned that the parties had bar-
gained for the arbitrator's judgment, not the Court's.1 8 9 The Court noted,
however, that the arbitrator's award can be upheld only to the extent that it
"draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement."' 90
Suits brought to enforce or overturn an arbitrator's award are brought
under section 301.191 Under a Steelworker's Trilogy analysis, the award will
be enforced except in some narrow circumstances, 192 such as when the union
has breached its duty of fair representation. 193 Courts reviewing arbitration
awards under the Enterprise Wheel & Car "essence" standard acknowledge
that the arbitrator has wide discretion to interpret the contract and existing
law to solve the contractual dispute at hand and require only that the arbi-
trator's award be a rational interpretation of the agreement. 94
The arbitrator, however, may not order an award that would constitute an
unfair labor practice.195 Such an award would be "repugnant" to the Taft-
Hartley Act.1 96 More broadly, arbitration awards that violate other specific
statutory prohibitions are contrary to public policy and therefore cannot be
enforced. 197 This narrow public policy exception is the door through which
exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine enter the unionized setting.
187. Id.
188. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
189. 363 U.S. at 598-99.
190. Id. at 597.
191. See, e.g., Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449-56 (asserting broad scope of § 301 jurisdiction
during discussion of legislative rejection of common law rule that executory agreements to
arbitrate are unenforceable).
192. See supra note 8; see also supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); supra notes 155-
60 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Local Union 59, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Green Corp., 725 F.2d 264,
268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 124 (1984); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of
Ga. Ry., 415 F.2d 403, 412 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970); Ludwig Honold
Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1132-33 (3d Cir. 1969).
195. General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v. Standard Brands, Inc., 579 F.2d
1282, 1291 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979); Sperry Systems Management
Division v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1976); Local 7-210,
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. Union Tank Car Co., 475 F.2d 194 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 875 (1973); Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 520, ILGWU, 283 F.2d 936 (4th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); accord Local Union 59, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Work-
ers v. Green Corp., 725 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 124 (1984).
196. General Warehousemen & Helpers, 579 F.2d at 1293.
197. Even before the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court had noted in dicta that an
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Thus, the development of public policy exceptions to the employment at-will
doctrine 198 may provide the vehicle by which unionized workers may cir-
cumvent their grievance procedure and bring suit in state court for wrongful
discharge.
Nevertheless, the practical effect of this Maddox-Steelworkers axis is that a
union member wishing to sue for breach of his collective bargaining agree-
ment must exhaust the agreement's arbitration procedure. Once the arbitra-
tion procedure has run its course, absent one of the narrow exceptions
outlined above, 99 the courts will defer to that arbitration decision 2" and
will not allow suit to proceed under the Steelworkers Trilogy rationale.2 "1
After exhaustion of such grievance procedure, a subsequent section 301 suit
will be dismissed because of Maddox exclusivity principles.2"2
arbitration award should be vacated if the award were in "manifest disregard" of the law.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
In American Postal Workers v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983), an arbitration award reinstating a postal worker who had
participated in a strike was vacated as illegal and, therefore, against public policy. Under 5
U.S.C. § 7311 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983), persons who participate in a strike against the United
States government are prohibited from federal government employment. In General Team-
sters Local Union 249 v. Consolidated Freightways, 464 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa. 1979), Team-
sters were discharged for refusing to drive their trucks without mud flaps, as required by
Pennsylvania law. An arbitration award upholding the discharges was vacated because the
practical effect of the award was to require the Teamsters to violate state law. Id. at 349.
Arbitration awards need not directly violate a specific statute in order to be overturned as
against public policy. See United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 736
F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984). In this Postal Workers case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit refused to enforce a reinstatement order for a postal service employee who
had been convicted of and subsequently discharged for embezzling postal money orders. See
also Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 540 v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.
1983). In Local 540 a driver was discharged for wrecking a company tractor trailor and subse-
quently receiving a citation for drinking while driving. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regula-
tion, 49 C.F.R. § 392.5 (1984), prohibits motor carrier drivers from consuming intoxicating
liquor within four hours before operating a motor carrier. These regulations were found to
constitute sufficient public policy to deny enforcement of an arbitration award of reinstate-
ment. Local 540, 712 F.2d at 125. Cf supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (public policy
exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine). But cf Local 453, Int'l Union of Elec. Work-
ers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963) (arbitration
award ordering reinstatement of an employee who gambled on company premises upheld be-
cause public policy against gambling sufficiently protected by criminal sanctions, and em-
ployee's discharge was too severe a penalty under the circumstances).
198. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 8.
202. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (arbitration deci-
sion is the exclusive remedy absent breach of the duty of fair representation).
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IV. EXHAUSTION, DEFERRAL, AND PREEMPTION
One type of interplay between deferral to arbitration in the courts and
federal preemption of state law through Garmon, Machinists, or section 301
preemption is illustrated by the recent decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.203
Buscemi, a member of the International Association of Machinists, was cov-
ered by the union's collective bargaining agreement with McDonnell Doug-
las. He was discharged and pursued the grievance procedure provided by
the union. The union, however, refused to go to arbitration on his behalf.2"
Buscemi subsequently filed suit in the Superior Court of California against
McDonnell Douglas for retaliatory discharge, wrongful termination, and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress-all recognized causes of action
under the California employment at-will doctrine.2" 5 He alleged that he had
been fired for circulating petitions among his fellow employees in which he
had voiced complaints regarding certain employer practices.2 °6 After Mc-
Donnell Douglas removed the case to federal district court, Buscemi added
the union as a defendant, alleging breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion.20 7 The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. 208 Af-
firming the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that Buscemi's allegation
that his discharge was retaliatory was preempted by Garmon because his
conduct was arguably protected by section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act.20 9
Buscemi based his claim of wrongful termination on California law, which
allows recovery in tort when a discharge violates public policy or a statute,
or when it breaches an implied contract of employment.21° The court ob-
served in dicta that, as a union member working under a collective bargain-
ing agreement, Buscemi could not claim breach of an implied contract.
The Ninth Circuit therefore also affirmed the district court's characteriza-
tion of the complaint as a breach of contract action arising under section 301
203. 736 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984).
204. Id. at 1349.
205. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
206. Buscemi, 736 F.2d at 1350.
207. Id. at 1349.
208. Id. The district court dismissed Buscemi's complaint on the grounds that (1) his dis-
charge was allegedly for § 7-protected activity and therefore preempted under the Garmon
primary jurisdiction rationale; (2) the use of a California at-will tort claim was properly cogni-
zable as a § 301 action for breach of Buscemi's collective bargaining agreement; and (3) Bus-
cemi's complaint was time barred under the six-month statute of limitations defined in
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). Buscemi, 736 F.2d at
1349-50.
209. Id.
210. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
211. Buscemi, 736 F.2d at 1350.
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of the Taft-Hartley Act.2 2
Interestingly, Buscemi added his union as a defendant only after the case
was removed to federal district court. At that time, the employer had raised
as a defense its contention that the suit should properly be characterized as
one arising under section 301.213 Were the suit so characterized, the em-
ployer would be able to defend on the ground that Buscemi had not ex-
hausted his contractual remedies under the Maddox rule.2"4 Additionally,
to prevail in a section 301 suit, Buscemi would have to prove not only breach
of contract by the employer but also the union's breach of its duty of fair
representation. 2  Apparently, by adding the union as a defendant, Buscemi
was attempting to preserve at least a section 301 action against his employer.
The allegation of breach of the union's duty of fair representation, however,
belied Buscemi's claim that his cause of action arose under California, and
not federal, law. The case was found to be subject to the grievance proce-
dure of Buscemi's collective bargaining agreement, preempted by section
301, and thus dismissed.21 6
In contrast, a Teamster in California was able to maintain an action under
California at-will doctrine in spite of the unionized setting in Garibaldi v.
Lucky Food Stores. 2 17 Garibaldi was employed by Lucky Food Stores under
a collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration of otherwise un-
resolved grievances.2 18 In March 1979, Garibaldi noticed that a load of milk
he was to deliver was spoiled and reported this to his employer, who ordered
him to proceed with the delivery.219 Garibaldi did not deliver the milk but
rather reported it to the local health department, which condemned the
212. Id. at 1350-5 1. Cf Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980). In
Fristoe, a unionized employee stylized his complaint for wrongful discharge in common law
terms. The court held that the action was preempted. "The court's recharacterization of Fris-
toe's complaint as one arising under § 301 is required by federal preemption doctrines." 615
F.2d at 1212.
213. See supra notes 5, 130-36, and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 137-68 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 148-61 and accompanying text; see also Graf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co.,
697 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1983) (application of union's breach of duty of fair representation under
Railway Labor Act). Employees are not required to exhaust the bargained-for grievance pro-
cedure when that procedure is futile. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text. Retirees
are not required to exhaust grievance procedures. See Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 752
F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1985). Of course, the grievance procedure must be intended to be exclu-
sive. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 657-58. See also Vaca, 368 U.S. at 177-78; supra note 8.
216. Buscemi, 736 F.2d at 1352.
217. 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).




milk. 220  Garibaldi was discharged in October 1980 and subsequently
grieved his discharge.221 An arbitrator found that Garibaldi had been dis-
charged for cause.222 Garibaldi then filed a complaint in California Superior
Court, claiming "damages for bad faith, wrongful termination and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress," alleging he had been discharged be-
cause of his report to the health department.223 The employer removed the
case to federal court.224 The district court ruled that Garibaldi's cause of
action for wrongful termination was actually a breach of contract action
arising under section 301.225 Unlike Buscemi, Garibaldi never claimed that
his discharge was even arguably an unfair labor practice. Garmon preemp-
tion thus was not implicated.
Before the Ninth Circuit, the employer argued that Garibaldi's termina-
tion claim was preempted by the operation of both the collective bargaining
agreement's grievance procedure and section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.226
The court admitted that the question of whether a claim for wrongful dis-
charge is preempted solely by a union contract, when the claim is based on a
violation of state public policy, was one of first impression.227
220. Id. See CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 32,906 (West 1968) (making it unlawful "to sell ... or
deliver. . . any impure, polluted, tainted, unclean, unwholesome, stale or adulterated milk").




225. Id. at 1368-69. The district court based this finding on principles outlined in Fristoe
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980). Id. at 1369. "Mere omission of refer-
ence to LMRA [the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act] § 301 in the complaint
does not preclude federal subject matter jurisdiction." 615 F.2d at 1212. See supra note 213.
226. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1369.
227. Id. at 1371. The court's characterization of the case as one of first impression is inter-
esting. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had found previously that an
Oklahoma retaliatory discharge statute was not preempted. Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666
F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981). The Oklahoma statute forbids discharge in retaliation for filing a
workmen's compensation claim. The Peabody panel found it "inconceivable that there would
be state court interference with federal labor policy in connection with the present type of
statute." 666 F.2d at 1316. Thus, there was no Machinists preemption, nor was Garmon pre-
emption indicated on the facts.
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Peabody centered on an analogy to Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), holding that rights under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1 1983), supplemented rights contained in collective
bargaining agreements. Peabody, 666 F.2d at 1320-21. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1982) (supplemental statutory rights found in the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-218 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
The Oregon Supreme Court had reached the same result on a similar workmen's compensa-
tion statute in Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tele. Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980). In
addition to following a Gardner-Denver supplemental statutory rights analysis, the court also
pronounced that Oregon had a substantial interest in the integrity of its workmen's compensa-
tion system. 289 Or. at 88-89, 611 P.2d at 287. The Oregon high court further held that
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The Garibaldi court relied on the plurality opinion in New York Telephone
Co. v. New York State Department of Labor,22 8 in which the Supreme Court
ruled, inter alia, that a state law will not be preempted by federal labor law
when: (1) it serves a state purpose other than regulation of the bargaining
relationship; and (2) it does not frustrate the implementation of federal labor
laws.2 29 The court reasoned that California's interest in ensuring that only
wholesome milk is distributed within the state was wholly unrelated to regu-
lation of the bargaining relationship.2"' The court further held that Califor-
nia had a legitimate interest in ensuring that employment cannot be
conditioned upon required participation in unlawful conduct by an em-
ployee.231 In addition, the Ninth Circuit asserted that reporting to the local
health department was precisely the type of conduct California sought to
protect in the state's exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine. 232
The court flatly stated that a tort claim for wrongful discharge based upon
a state's public policy would not significantly interfere with the collective
bargaining process because of the difference between contractual remedies
and remedies available in tort.233 The court buried its analysis, however, in
a footnote.234 That analysis centered on the proposition that state statutory
rights operate independently of rights arising from the collective bargaining
agreement.235
because the workmen's compensation laws afforded supplemental or alternative remedies to
those contained in the collective bargaining agreement, exhaustion was not required of the
aggrieved employee. 289 Or. at 89-90, 611 P.2d at 289. Using an analysis derived from the
Steelworkers Trilogy, the court reasoned that because the rights Vaughn was trying to enforce
were beyond the power of the arbitrator to address, exhaustion was superfluous. 289 Or. at 90,
611 P.2d at 291.
228. 440 U.S. 519 (1979). See supra notes 114-15, 123-24, and accompanying text.
229. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1372 (citing New York Tele., 440 U.S. at 519).
230. Id. at 1374.
231. Id. (citing Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845). See
supra note 41 and accompanying text. Although the Garibaldi court states that the public
policy exception for wrongful discharge cases was established in Tameny, the first California
case was 21 years before that. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). See supra notes 36-42, 44, and accompanying text.
232. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1374.
233. Id. at 1375.
234. See id. at 1375 n.12.
235. Id. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. In support of its result in Garibaldi,
the Ninth Circuit cited Machinists Automotive Trades Dist. Lodge No. 190 v. Utility Trailer
Sales Co., 141 Cal. App. 3d 80, 190 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1st Dist.), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 1005
(1983), which was rather backhanded support for its analysis. In Utility Trailer Sales, the
worker's state statutory right to indemnity was not preempted by federal labor law, id., and, in
fact, the Supreme Court dismissed the case for want of a substantial federal question. 464 U.S.
1005 (1983). The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's dismissal to be a decision on
the merits of the case.
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Finally, the court examined the effect of the adverse arbitration decision
Garibaldi received in regard to his right to bring subsequent court action.
The court posited that independent statutory rights exist outside of the col-
lective bargaining process. 236 According to the Ninth Circuit, the distinc-
tion between these contractual and statutory rights was not obliterated
merely because both were violated as a result of the same occurrence. 237
The court's preemption analysis clearly showed that Garibaldi's action
had a separate, identified basis outside the collective bargaining agree-
ment.23' To the Garibaldi court, that the state statutory basis had survived
Garmon preemption lent support to the court's conclusion that the arbitra-
tion decision adjudicated only those contractual rights and did not affect the
state statutory claim. 239 The arbitration decision, therefore, did not preempt
California's tort remedy for Garibaldi.24
Garibaldi was distinguished by the Ninth Circuit in Olguin v. Inspiration
Consolidated Copper Co. 241 The applicable collective bargaining agreement
provided that employees could be fired only "for just cause"2 4 2 and further
provided a grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration.243
Olguin filed a complaint with the Federal Mine Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (MSHA), alleging that his discharge had been in retaliation for com-
plaints that he had filed previously with the MSHA. 2 4 Olguin also filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB based upon his discharge.
245
The NLRB regional director declined to issue a complaint against the com-
pany,241 citing insufficient evidence and the NLRB practice of deferral to
236. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1375.
237. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1375 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at
53). In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, there likewise had been an adverse arbitral decision. See
also Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1375-76 and n.13.
238. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
239. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1376.
240. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
241. 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
242. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
244. 740 F.2d at 1471. Olguin filed his complaint pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1977).
245. Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1471. By reporting hazardous working conditions that might
affect both himself and his fellow workers, Olguin was arguably engaging in concerted activity
for "mutual aid or protection" within the meaning of § 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1982 & Supp. 11983). Cf Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (remanding to
the NLRB for reexamination of whether the conduct of a single worker in relation to safety at
the workplace constitutes protected concerted activity within the meaning of § 7 of the Taft-
Hartley Act), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W 3309 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1985) (No. 85-464), and cert. de-
nied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1985) (No. 85-463).
246. Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1471.
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MSHA on retaliatory discharge claims.247 The mine safety agency found
Olguin had not been discriminatorily discharged. 248 After unsuccessful ad-
ministrative appeals to both the NLRB and MSHA, Olguin filed suit in Ari-
zona Superior Court.249  Olguin's complaint, like Garibaldi's, alleged
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.250 Olguin also alleged wrongful discharge in violation of
an unidentified employment agreement and breach of an implied contract
arising from a personnel policy manual.25'
Because of these allegations, Olguin's complaint was faulty in several re-
spects. The collective bargaining agreement under which Olguin was cov-
ered contained a clause stating that the contract and addenda referenced in
the contract were the sole agreement between the union, its covered em-
ployee, and the employer.252 Olguin's suit was, necessarily, one to enforce
the collective bargaining agreement, despite the omission of any reference to
the agreement in his complaint. The grievance procedure was Olguin's ex-
clusive remedy and section 301 thus preempted the count of the complaint
that alleged his discharge was in violation of an implied contract.253
Olguin's cause of action for wrongful discharge was based on a common law
right to be discharged only for cause. 254 That right, however, was seen by
the court as "essentially equivalent" to the just-cause dismissal clause in
Olguin's collective bargaining agreement.255 The court therefore read that
count of the complaint as one for breach of contract 256 and found it similarly
preempted.25 7
The complaint of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy involved
federal mine safety law. Unlike Garibaldi, Olguin could not point to a state
statute pursuant to which he had acted; instead he cited only general state
"public policy." Olguin alleged that he was discriminatorily discharged for
whistleblowing on violations of federal mine safety statutes. The Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that Arizona's interest in enforcing federal mine safety law was




250. Id. at 1475.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1474.
253. Id. at 1475-76. See Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Em-
ployee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975).
254. Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1474.
255. Id. at 1474.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1474-75.
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was preempted by federal law.25 8 Finally, the court viewed Olguin's com-
plaint of intentional infliction of emotional distress as arising out of the mere
fact of his discharge and not the manner in which he was discharged.2 5 9 The
fact of Olguin's discharge was already shown to be covered by the collective
bargaining agreement and, therefore, by section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act.2 6° Consequently, Olguin's remedy lay in the exclusive grievance proce-
dures provided in his contract.2 6 The court concluded that because Olguin
had not used the grievance procedure, his section 301 suit was not viable.
2 62
The Olguin court distinguished Garibaldi in two ways. First, if a claim of
discharge in violation of public policy is to escape preemption, that claim
must be based solely on state law.2 63 Second, the alleged tort of infliction of
emotional distress must arise out of conduct not subject to federal regula-
tion.2" The emotional distress itself must be inflicted not from the fact of
discharge but from some other set of circumstances, such as the egregious
manner in which the distress was inflicted, that may or may not be factually
linked to the collective bargaining agreement.2 65
The nexus of rights embodied in a collective bargaining agreement and
violation of rights outside of that agreement, but nevertheless factually
linked to it, present close questions in preemption analysis. Last Term, the
Supreme Court examined the confluence of state-established rights and col-
lective bargaining agreements in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck.26 6 In
Lueck, a unionized employee brought an action for bad faith in the handling
of an insurance claim against his employer and the administrator of the em-
ployer's self-insured disability plan. Lueck alleged that the defendants "in-
tentionally, contemptuously, and repeatedly failed" to pay disability benefits
to which he was entitled under the terms of the disability plan established by
his union's collective bargaining agreement with Allis-Chalmers.267 Lueck
did not attempt to invoke the contract's grievance procedure but instead
brought his suit in Milwaukee County Circuit Court.2 68
258. Id. at 1475.
259. Id. at 1476; see also Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290
(1977).
260. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
261. Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1476.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1475.
264. Id. at 1476.
265. Cf Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (tort arising
not from discharge under collective bargaining agreements, but from malicious handling of
discharge).
266. 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
267. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. at 1908.
268. Id.
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If Lueck's bad faith claim were properly characterized as breach of con-
tract, then section 301 would govern. In that case, Lueck's contractual rem-
edies-the grievance procedure-would have to be exhausted before suit
could be maintained.269 If his claim were properly characterized as exclu-
sively a tort claim arising only out of breach of statutory duties by the insur-
ance carrier and administrator, the grievance procedure would be unable to
remedy the wrong, section 301 would not apply, and the state court action
could proceed. Upon appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that
in an insurance context, the tort of bad faith did not necessarily entail a
breach of contract. 270 That court characterized Lueck's tort claim as one
"separate and independent" from a claim for breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. 27' The tort did not arise out of a breach of the insurance
contract but rather out of the manner in which Lueck's disability claim was
handled.27 2 Consequently, Lueck was not required to exhaust his grievance
procedure.
The United States Supreme Court reversed.273 In a unanimous deci-
274sion, the Court held that resolution of the state law claim was dependent
upon interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 27' The basis of
the Wisconsin court's decision, that state law and not the labor contract
created implied provisions of good faith, was an assumption that state law
could not make.276 According to the Court, the breadth of the grievance
clause at issue277 "hardly suggest[ed]" that only the right to receive benefits,
and not the manner in which they were received, was covered by the griev-
ance procedure.278
The Court noted that the collective bargaining agreement did indeed posit
two separate duties, the implied duty to act in good faith and the explicit
269. See supra note 8.
270. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 565, 342 N.W.2d 699, 702 (1984),
rev'd, Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
271. Id. at 565, 342 N.W.2d at 702. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25,
430 U.S. 290 (1977); cf Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984)
(examples of preemption where tort arises out of breach of contract itself); Fristoe v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980).
272. See supra notes 58-93, 115-29, and accompanying text.
273. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
274. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Powell took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
275. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. at 1914-15.
276. Id. at 1913.
277. With reference to the disability plan, a Joint Plant Insurance Committee was empow-
ered to resolve disputes involving "any insurance-related issues that may arise." Lueck 105 S.




contractual duty to pay.2 79 The extent and interpretation of those duties,
however, were plainly questions preempted by section 301.280
The Supreme Court reasoned further that Lueck's failure to exhaust his
contractual grievance should have led to dismissal of the state claim under a
Lucas Flour analysis.2"' While the State of Wisconsin may have wished to
characterize the actions involved in Lueck as tort, the federal common law
of section 301 required that the bargained-for arbitration provide the deci-
sion in this case.282
According to the Lueck Court, the need for both an effective arbitration
system and avoidance of conflicting state interpretations of contract terms
plainly preempted Lueck's tort claim. Lueck fell under the alternative dis-
missals of preemption by section 301 or failure to exhaust grievance proce-
dures under Maddox.283
Notably, the Lueck Court asserted that this decision did not mean that all
state rights which may relate to provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment would automatically be preempted in a manner similar to Lueck's. 84
Preemption of state claims by federal labor law "remains to be fleshed out on
a case-by-case basis." '285 Certain state tort claims, based on employment at-
will principles, may still survive preemption even after Lueck.
The Court was careful to point out the distinction between state law rights
and obligations that exist independently of private agreements and those
which may be waived or altered by agreement of contracting parties.286
These independent state law rights were termed "non-negotiable" by the
Lueck Court.287 It would seem that at least some of the public policy excep-
tions to the employment at-will doctrine implicate such nonnegotiable
rights.
288
279. Id. at 1913-14.
280. Id. at 1914-15.
281. Id. at 1915; see supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text (discussing Lucas Flour as
heralding development of substantive federal labor law under § 301); see also supra notes 137-
71 (discussing concomitant Maddox exhaustion prerequisites).
282. Lueck 105 S. Ct. at 1915-16.
283. Id. at 1916.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1912. The Court relied upon a comparison to Malone v. White Motor Corp.,
435 U.S. 497 (1978). In Malone, the Court found that the federally ordained state regulation
of pension funds was not preempted by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated under the
Taft-Hartley Act. Id. at 504-05. The Malone Court found congressional intent clearly indi-
cated that regulation of certain pension funds was to be left to the states. Id. at 505. Collective
bargaining agreements, even though negotiated under federal auspices, could not preempt
these nonnegotiable state prerogatives.
287. Lueck 105 S. Ct. at 1912.
288. See supra note 40.
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B. Expansion of Workers' Remedies
From Lueck, Buscemi, Garibaldi, and Olguin, a model for preemption of
state tort claims for wrongful discharge may be developed. Under the fol-
lowing scenario, a unionized worker can escape preemption and bring a state
tort claim for wrongful discharge. As is the usual case, the scenario deals
with a unionized worker whose collective bargaining agreement contains
both a "just cause" dismissal clause and a grievance procedure that not only
culminates in binding arbitration but also purports to be exclusive as to all
grievances arising in the employment relationship.289 The union member
must engage in some conduct furthering a public policy of the worker's
state.290  For the purposes of this model, it is preferable that the policy be
embodied in a state statute.29' After engaging in conduct that furthers pub-
lic policy, the union member is discharged for his action. The worker now
may or may not file a grievance based upon the discharge.2 92 If the worker
does file a grievance, the union may or may not process the grievance to
arbitration.293 The union member need not request that the union fully pro-
cess the grievance.294
At this point, the union member must bring a state claim against the em-
ployer for wrongful discharge, assuming that the state provides fui such an
action.29 5 The defendant employer should attempt to remove the action to
federal court under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.29 6 Although the
removal requires the recharacterization of the action as one arising under
289. See supra notes 3, 4.
290. See supra notes 217-40 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 37-47 and accom-
panying text. What precisely is the public policy of the state and how the worker's action
furthers that policy are determinations for the trial court.
291. See supra notes 41, 43-47, and accompanying text. The balancing of federal and local
interests inherent in these preemption analyses is accomplished more easily if the state's inter-
est is codified.
292. Compare Garibaldi, 726 F.2d 1367, discussed supra at notes 216-37 and accompany-
ing text (grievance filed and arbitration decision rendered but state court action not pre-
empted), with Buscemi, 736 F.2d 1348, discussed supra notes 203-16 and accompanying text
(grievance filed and no arbitration decision rendered but nonetheless preempted) and Vaughn
v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tele. Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281, discussed supra at note 227
(status of grievance irrelevant to preemption of workmen's compensation statute).
293. See supra note 169.
294. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 188-95.
295. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
296. Removal jurisdiction derives from § 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1982 & Supp. 11983), granting original jurisdiction to the federal district courts for
suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982 & Supp. I
1983), allowing removal of actions over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction. Cf.




section 301, courts have not been reluctant to recharacterize state suits. 297 If
the suit is so recharacterized, the defendant employer may invoke one of
three strains of preemption analysis to have the suit dismissed from state
court as preempted. First, if the state, in examining the worker's claim,
would have to examine that aspect of the worker's conduct that the NLRB
would examine in deciding whether the discharge was arguably protected or
prohibited by section 7 or 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, the action is within the
primary jurisdiction of the NLRB and is thereby "Garmon preempted.
298
Second, if state jurisdiction and regulation of the employer's or employee's
conduct concerning the discharge would upset the balance of economic
power by depriving the employer or employee of a weapon in the economic
war recognized by Congress, the action is "Machinists preempted., 299 Both
Garmon and Machinists preemptions, however, contain certain traditional
"local interest exceptions" that may impinge upon these determinations.
Third, if the employee did not attempt to use the grievance procedure of the
collective bargaining agreement, a subsequent section 301 suit is precluded
by the Maddox exclusivity rule.3°° If the employee used the grievance pro-
cedure and received a final decision, either an arbitration decision or a deci-
sion by the union not to proceed to arbitration, a section 301 suit is
precluded by the Steelworkers Trilogy preference for arbitration. 3 0  Finally,
if the worker attempts to bring suit against the employer and does not allege
breach of the union's duty of fair representation, the union member is hurled
back into the Maddox arbitration exclusivity requirement by Vaca.3 °2
Avoidance of these preemption pitfalls is, ultimately, policy bound. Arbi-
tration awards which are contrary to public policy may keep jurisdiction
within the state courts. To avoid Garmon preemption, the worker's action
must be for the benefit of the state and its citizenry3 3 and cannot be for the
"mutual aid or protection" 3°4 of fellow workers alone.305 To circumvent
297. See, e.g., Olguin, 740 F.2d 1468, discussed supra at notes 241-62 and accompanying
text; Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (1980) ("Mere omission of reference
to LMRA [Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act] § 301 in the complaint does not
preclude federal subject matter jurisdiction. The court's recharacterization of Fristoe's com-
plaint as one arising under § 301 is required by federal preemption doctrines.").
298. See supra notes 58-93 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 172-201 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 148-61 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 37-47 and accom-
panying text.
304. Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act reads, in part, "Employees shall have the right...
to engage in other concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
1985] 1015
Catholic University Law Review
Machinists preemption, the state claim must be immune from an interpreta-
tion that state law is attempting to regulate part of the collective bargaining
process or relationship that Congress meant to remain unregulated.3 °6 Both
Garmon and Machinists preemption analyses have been applied in cases re-
vealing a "local interest exception. '30 7 While the local interest exception
may be useful in avoiding preemption, those interests similarly are bound by
policy.3"'
Avoidance of Maddox, Vaca, or the Steelworkers Trilogy "preemption"
30 9
depends upon whether plaintiff can prevent the suit from being characterized
as a breach of contract action. 3 0  Given the posited just-cause dismissal
clause and the scope of the grievance procedure in the collective bargaining
agreement, dismissal would seem to be an arbitrable matter and the action
would be preempted, therefore, by the Maddox-Steelworkers axis.31' The
arbitral decision, however, is only legitimate insofar as it "draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement., 312  Even after Lueck, a state
claim adjudicating rights existing independently of the collective bargaining
agreement should not necessarily be preempted.31 3
For a unionized worker to thread her way through the above model, the
state's interest in the discharge must be found to override the federal labor
scheme at every step. In Lueck, the state's contractual duty of good faith
was too closely allied with the clearly arbitral interpretation of the explicit
305. Cf supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (discussing how public policy consider-
ations affect arbitration awards).
306. See supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
308. Compare Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress allowed because distress resulted from the man-
ner of union's treatment of plaintiff), with Olguin, 740 F.2d 1468, discussed supra at notes 241-
62 and accompanying text (claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress not allowed
because distress resulted from fact of plaintiff's discharge).
309. The Maddox-Steelworkers axis does not supplant a body of state law with federal law
but rather requires deferral to a collective bargaining agreement. See supra notes 8, 191-98,
and accompanying text.
310. Cf Olguin, 740 F.2d 1468; Buscemi, 736 F.2d 1348; Fristoe, 615 F.2d 1209 (all
recharacterizing state court actions as claims cognizable under § 301).
311. See, e.g., Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (state tort claim for bad faith handling of insurance
claim under disability plan contained in collective bargaining agreement so entwined with sub-
stantive terms of agreement as to require recharacterization of state suit as § 301 action); see
also supra notes 297, 310, and accompanying text.
312. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597. Arbitration awards will be denied
enforcement if the arbitrator acts outside of the authority granted by the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. See supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981) (Oklahoma statute
forbidding retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workmen's compensation claim not pre-
empted for unionized workers); see also supra notes 170, 197.
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substantive terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 3 4 Uniformity of
federal labor law necessitated subjugation of Wisconsin's theories of contract
and insurance laws.315 State interests could not override the federal labor
scheme in Buscemi because that employee in fact was asserting rights ex-
isting under the federal labor scheme, especially those preempted under a
Garmon analysis.316 In Olguin, state concerns could not override the federal
scheme because Olguin had not asserted any state interest.317 In Garibaldi,
however, the asserted state interest was found sufficient to override even the
adverse arbitration decision.
318
If the balancing of state and federal interests is the main concern of all
311~forms of preemption analysis, it seems that in allowing unionized workers
to bring state tort claims for wrongful discharge, the courts might not give
due regard to the federal interest in the primacy of arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism. While Lueck certainly provided a stirring reaffirma-
tion of the primacy of arbitration, the Court left open the possibility that
workers may vindicate their rights without the help of the union. Ulti-
mately, this possibility may detract from the union's position as exclusive
bargaining agent.32° When courts permit unionized workers to circumvent
their grievance procedures, employers, who had bargained to limit the work-
ers' remedies against them321 are open to a new range of actions. While
arbitrators' remedies are confined usually to back pay and reinstatement for
discharged workers, 322 state tort claims may produce not only compensatory
damages but punitive damages as well.323 As the grievance procedure be-
comes nonexclusive in the settlement of contractual disputes, 324 the proce-
dure's attractiveness as a means of dispute resolution wanes.32 5
As a result of the development of state tort actions that survive preemp-
tion, the union member is no longer wholly dependent on the union for pro-
314. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. at 1914-15.
315. Id. at 1916.
316. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 217-40 and accompanying text.
319. See generally Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
320. The Supreme Court also has noted on several occasions that the inclusion of a griev-
ance procedure in a collective bargaining agreement is "the quid pro quo for an agreement not
to strike." Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); see United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
321. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
322. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 648 (3d ed. 1973).
323. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980).
324. See, e.g., Garibaldi, 726 F.2d 1367, discussed supra notes 217-40 (discharged employee
allowed to sue for monetary damages despite adverse arbitral decision).
325. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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tection against discharge for improper cause; the union member may seek
redress in the state courts. Such redress is sought, although the limitations
of this avenue are highly restrictive, because the arbitration process does not
always yield satisfactory results 326 and because, in cases like Garibaldi, the
at-will action is available even to a unionized worker who has availed himself
of the bargained-for arbitration procedure.
327
The use of exceptions to the at-will doctrine in a unionized context ad-
versely affects trade unionism by making the bargained-for grievance proce-
dures, the union's primary means of enforcing workers' rights, only one of
the remedies available to a discharged worker. From the viewpoint of the
employee, the employer, and the union, application of at-will doctrine in the
unionized setting directly affects the collective bargaining process.3 28
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the apparent effect of a unionized application of exceptions to the
employment at-will doctrine on the collective bargaining process, the appli-
cation may not be as onerous as it appears. Arbitration does not necessarily
provide justice to the discharged employee; however, adjudication in state
courts of wrongful discharge claims may.3 2 9 Moreover, the applications of
this doctrine in the unionized setting are very narrow. Provision of just-
cause dismissal and arbitration clauses usually ensure protection against dis-
charge for unionized workers for myriad reasons. Exceptions to the at-will
doctrine ensure against only improper discharge. In the unionized setting,
exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine may ensure against "im-
proper" arbitration decisions.
Nevertheless, it is at least ironic that the American employment at-will
doctrine, a rule that gave impetus to the trade union movement, has re-
turned to that movement as an opportunity for workers to protect them-
selves further against discharge for exercising important state-protected
326. See, e.g., Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1367. Although the record is unclear, there is no
suggestion that Garibaldi was discharged for any reason other than his refusal to deliver the
milk. The Ninth Circuit's opinion does not address whether Garibaldi's discharge was in re-
taliation for his report to the health department.
327. See Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1368.
328. The establishment of a just-cause dismissal standard for all workers has been sug-
gested by some commentators. This proposal would require the establishment of a nationwide
arbitration system to rule on dismissals. See generally Catler, The Case Against Proposals to
Eliminate the Employment At Will Rule, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 471 (1983). Such a national
system would render union grievance procedures obsolete by redundancy. To the extent that
exceptions to the employment at-will rule begin to equalize the position of unionized and
nonunionized workers, unions themselves become redundant.
329. Cf Garibaldi, 726 F.2d 1367 (arbitration decision held that milk truck driver was
dismissed "for cause" for reporting spoiled milk to state health board).
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rights. It is an interesting turn of events that in this peculiar application of
the employment at-will doctrine, the pendulum has swung from an era when
the employer reigned supreme, through a time when the strength of collec-
tive worker action might offset employer power, to the present moment, in
which the individual worker can challenge the dispute resolution structure
that both company and union have built for themselves.
David L. Durkin

